The Oregonian editorial “McChrystal speaks – now what?” is right to be cautious
about General McChrystal’s call for more troops (here):
It is possible to believe that the general is right about what is required
to prevail in Afghanistan but to doubt the wisdom of continuing the fight. And
it is impossible not to regret the long, inconclusive slog that today requires
the United States and its allies to rethink and recommit to the fight in
Afghanistan.
This may just be a bridge too far for the United States.
It is, indeed, a bridge too far!
General McChrystral’s assessment of the situation in Afghanistan has been
published by the Washington Post (here): In sum he finds:
The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be
taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in
some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.
We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of
confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international
community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.
Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to
align with us against the insurgents.
Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder
or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are
required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point
entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a
significant.change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.
Although it is clear from the report that McChrystal intends to ask for more
troops, he does not give a number.
My thoughts are:
(1) I’m
in general agreement with McChrystal on his counterinsurgency strategy. If we
are going to make any kind fight for nation-building or development, he’s
heading down the right road. But maybe that’s not what we should be doing, and,
most certainly, we do not have enough boots on the ground in Afghanistan to do
it right.
(2) Unfortunately,
McChrystal has nowhere near enough troops for this task, and won’t, no matter
how many more the US puts up. We probably need over 500,000 coalition troops
(plus Afghan forces), just to throw out a big number, to pacify Afghanistan and
protect the population. It’s just too big a country. The only way we can get
that many troops is to broaden the coalition of countries fighting. And to do
that we need to get some of the countries with large armies, like China and
Turkey, to contribute significant numbers of troops. This is not going to
happen, at least not soon. It’s a “bridge too far.”
(3) His
report overlooks Pakistan. Because of its nuclear weapons, it is our major
concern in the region. And as the Oregonian editorial says:
The scope of the question is much broader than the
military strategy McChrystal proposes. His approach, for example, does not
address the havens that insurgents and terrorists have found in northern
Pakistan. If the fight in Afghanistan is hard and complicated, it is even more
so in Pakistan, where U.S. troops don't officially operate.
Then there are two dimension to this struggle that are not in McChrystal’s
report: a gas tax to reduce Al Qaida’s funding and upping language training so
soldiers and civilian can really work with the population.
(4) A
maximum effort to go after Al-Qaida should go after their funding not just from
poppies but from oil. We’re not doing that. We need a gas tax. As David J. Rothkopf says (here):
Afghanistan may have been the "good war"
when compared to Iraq. But both were waged in pursuit of the same goal: to make
America more secure and to defeat avowed enemies of the United States. There is
only one best way to do that. And it's not being done either in Iraq or
Afghanistan. It can't be done there. It has to be done here at home. It's
reducing our dependence on oil from the region and cutting into the flows of
that oil money that support bad actors.
(5) Our counterinsurgency in Afghanistan efforts
will fail unless we train a lot more soldiers in the languages of Afghanistan.
McChrystal’s assessment touches on this issue in two places (emphasis added)
As formidable as the threat may be, we make the problem harder. ISAF is a
conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with
challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are
exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate….
And later:
Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages.
Training just “key personnel” would not be enough.
I previously suggested what Congressman Wu, as a member of the House
Education and Labor Committee, could do to aid the effort in the
Afghan-Pakistan region (here):
(1) Holding
hearings on current K-16 efforts in the US to teach the languages of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and then propose legislation to increase the
number of US students studying those languages.
(2)
Holding hearings on current K-16 study abroad opportunities in
Pakistan, and then propose legislation to increase significantly the number of
US students, both K-12 and university, studying in Pakistan.
(3) Proposing
federal legislation that would give incentives to state to develop Go Global
High School Study Abroad Program.
I think Oregon on its own could hold such
hearing. Clearly, Oregon could offer online course in Pasto, Urdu and other
regional languages, could offer summer intensive course in those languages, and
could send high school students to study abroad in the region (if there are
safe places to send them).