More dithering, please!

President Obama, please continue dithering on Afghanistan.

Politics, even international politics, it seems to me, is a process of dithering. We are not going to prevail in Afghanistan by military force alone. Counterinsurgency forces can only create opportunities for internal, regional, and global politics, that is for more dithering, to create a stable, well-governed nation state in Afghanistan. The idea that Obama needs to make some big decision on Afghanistan is preposterous. That falls into the trap of thinking Afghanistan is only a military campaign that we can win. It’s not.

The NY Times article “All Afghan War Options by Obama Aides Said To Call for More Troops” by Peter Baker and Helene Cooper reports (here):

Advisers to President Obama are preparing three options for escalating the war effort in Afghanistan, all of them calling for more American troops, as he moves closer to a decision on the way forward in the eight-year-old war, officials said Saturday.

The options include Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s request for roughly another 40,000 troops; a middle scenario sending about 30,000 more troops; and a lower alternative involving 20,000 to 25,000 reinforcements, according to the officials, who insisted on anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

I’d rather phase back still more than Obama is likely to do, but even 40,000 more US troops just gets us more dithering. Counterinsurgency doctrine would call for 600,000 – 800,000 troops. Even with the ongoing training of Afghan troops we are not going to get there soon.

Further, trying to create a stable, well-run nation state in Afghanistan is not high on my list of global strategic priorities for the US. We need to shift the burden of nation state development in Afghanistan to others. Lots of dithering is in order to accomplish this.

Consider Stephen Walt’s blog post “To Encourage the Others” (here):

One of the many dubious arguments now being invoked to justify an open-ended U.S. commitment in Afghanistan is the idea that withdrawal will damage U.S. credibility and cause other U.S. clients to doubt our staying power. It's possible that getting out would cause a few weak and vulnerable leaders to reconsider their reliance on the United States, but is that necessarily a bad thing? The United States has been obsessed with maintaining "credibility" for decades, but we tend to forget that our credibility is more our clients' problem than it is ours. That's one of the nice things about being a superpower: even when our interests are partly tied up with the fates of others, most U.S. allies need our support a lot more than we need theirs.

In the case of Afghanistan, we are fighting on behalf of a corrupt and ineffective government that has resisted repeated calls for reform. If we were to stop throwing resources at it and it subsequently collapsed, we would be sending a powerful signal to other U.S. clients around the world. The message? Don't expect Uncle Sucker to back you forever if you can't or won’t shape up. Among other things, it might have a salutary effect on the government of Pakistan, and relieve us of the burden of constantly meddling in their affairs, which only makes us less popular there. (On that front, I'm beginning to think someone ought to filch Richard Holbrooke's passport; the more he visits the region, the more the Pakistani people seem to hate us). 

Instead of signaling a loss of American will, getting out of Afghanistan would remind other governments that the United States is not a philanthropic organization. Americans are willing to support competent and effective leaders whose interests are compatible with ours, but we are not in the business of endlessly subsidizing incompetence. In other words, we would telling friends and foes that we back winners, and we aren't inclined to waste resources on losers. So if you want our help, get your act together.  What's wrong with sending that message?

And consider Matthew Yglesias’ blog post “Hard to Get” (here)

Something the United States seem to have lost site of, is that alliance with and assistance from the country with the biggest economy and the largest military on the planet is a valuable thing to have. This is especially true because since we’re geographically isolated up here in North America and also a friendly democracy with a somewhat robust commitment to human rights, most countries and organizations are going to see us as a more desirable partner than whatever the locally available alternative is. This is something that ought to be turned to our advantage. Pretty much everyone needs us more than we need them, which ought to give us all the leverage.

But a hawkish disposition and an obsession with toughness tend to erode our ability to play hard to get. For example, consider the widespread ideas that we’re fighting a “necessary” war in Afghanistan and that the cooperation of Hamid Karzai is vital to our success in that war. These two ideas, when put in combination, lead to the slightly absurd conclusion that securing the cooperation of Hamid Karzai is necessary for the national security of the most powerful country on earth. In the real world, it should be the other way around. We have interests in Afghanistan that it would be nice to successfully pursue. But Karzai’s interests are much more fundamental than ours. What’s necessary—or at least closer to necessary—is for him to secure our cooperation by acting in a way that’s helpful. And it’s the same for Poland and Georgia and all the rest. Relationships with friendly clients are nice to have, but the wise superpower should know how to play hard to get.